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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of school quality on per-
formance in national exams and the career decision at age 16. We use micro data
for the UK, which provides a rich set of variables on parental background, previ-
ous achievements, and community variables. We find that, conditional on school
type, the pupil-teacher ratio has no effect on examination performance. The
pupil-teacher ratio has an effect on the career decision at age 16 as to whether
to remain in full time education beyond the minimum age, enroll in training
activities, or join the labour market full time. This finding appears to be very
robust, and sustains when school type variables, exam results, and ability are
controlled for.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the effect of schooling input on educational achievement and earnings
has been the subject of intensive research. Many studies seek to determine the effects
of school quality variables on later earnings. A few studies take a more direct approach
and try to estimate the effect of school input on examination success. The measures
for school quality typically used in this literature are pupil-teacher ratios, teachers’
salaries, or expenditures per pupil.
So far, the evidence on these effects is conflicting. The first systematic study has
been performed for the US (Coleman et al. (1966)) and concluded that there are hardly
any effects of school input. Some authors argue that most of the later research has
confirmed that view, and that the benefits of increased spending on school resources
are very limited (see, for example, Hanushek (1996), Betts (1995), Hanushek, Rivkin
and Taylor (1996)). In a recent survey, Hanushek (1996) comes to the conclusion that
three decades of research have shown that ”school resource variations are not closely
related to variations in student outcomes”.
Others argue that this evidence is far from conclusive. Positive effects of school
quality are found, for instance, by Johnston and Stafford (1973), Card and Krueger
(1992), and Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996). Card and Krueger (1996) sum-
marize evidence which is largely supportive of the view that school quality is positively
related to economic outcomes.
Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996) try to resolve this apparent conflict in the
literature. They argue that two factors may be responsible for the positive effects of
school quality on achievement: omitted variables, and aggregation. Omitting variables
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like family background, which have an independent effect on both the quality of schools
attended, and later earnings, leads to a positive spurious correlation between school
resources and performance. Furthermore, much of the work which is supportive for the
view that school expenditures bear a positive effect on the student’s achievement use
data on an aggregate level. For instance, Card and Krueger (1992) use state average
school characteristics. Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996) show that the omitted vari-
able bias can increase if the data is aggregated. Altonji and Dunn (1996), however, still
find positive effects of school inputs on wages. They use disaggregated data and solve
the problem of unobserved background variables by using variations among siblings in
high schools to control for family background. Goldhaber and Brewer (1998) use data
from the National Educational Longitudinal Study. They find that some schooling re-
sources do influence mathematics test scores. They further conclude that unobservable
school quality factors are important, but not correlated with observable school quality
variables.
We focus on the UK. While most studies in this field refer to the US, some studies
for the UK have recently appeared. Harmon and Walker (1997) investigate the impact
of school quality on wages. Dearden, Ferri and Meghir (1998) analyze the impact of
school quality on wages and education level attained at age 33. Feinstein and Symons
(1997) and Robertson and Symons (1996) analyze attainment measured by ability
tests for primary and secondary school, respectively. The main purpose of this paper
is twofold: we analyse the effect of school quality on examination performance and on
the career decision taken at age 16. Our analysis of examination performance relates
to the existing literature on school quality and school achievements. We are in a better
position than most existing studies for the US due to the rich nature of our data set,
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which allows us to explicitly address the problem of omitted variables.
There are only few studies on the impact of school quality on the level of education
achieved, although this clearly has important implications for education and training
policies. In a recent paper, Card and Krueger (1996) argue that an increase in school
quality induces students to attend school longer as a response to economic incentives
created by a higher payoff to schooling, or because school is simply more pleasant.
In fact, aggregate data suggest that school quality bears an effect on the length of
education (see Card and Krueger, 1992). We think of ultimate educational attainment
as the outcome of a stepwise decision process, and we focus on one step in that process.
In particular, we investigate the effect of school quality on the decision to stay in full
time education beyond the minimum required age, go into some type of training, or
join the labour market.
Our data are drawn from the National Child and Development Survey (NCDS).
It refers to a cohort born in 1958 in Britain and Wales. All the individuals in our
sample sit their first public examinations at age 16. After that, they have to decide
whether to join the labour market full time, enroll in some training scheme, or continue
full time education. The data is unique since it provides an unusually rich set of
variables, including family background information, school characteristics, previous
achievements of the individual, community variables, and parental preferences about
the child’s education. Our main measure for school quality is the pupil teacher ratio on
school level. This variable is a most visible measure of school quality and has attracted
considerable attention in the recent public discussion both in the US and the UK.
Our results are interesting in several respects. We find that family background,
working environment, as well as parental preferences, play a significant role for the
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academic performance of the offspring. The pupil teacher ratio has a significant and
negative effect on the child’s exam performance, conditional on parental background
variables and indicators for previous achievements at age 7 and 11. Omission of previous
achievement indicators leads to an inflation of the coefficient of our school quality
indicator by a factor 2. The effect of the pupil teacher ratio becomes insignificant if
we introduce school types as a further measure of school quality.
Again controlling for parental background variables and previous achievement, we
find that the pupil teacher ratio is an important determinant for the career choice at
age 16: pupils at schools with a lower pupil teacher ratio, are more likely to stay in
full time education. When we introduce school type variables, the effect decreases in
size, but remains significant. We check the robustness of our results for various model
assumptions. We also estimate models conditioning on exam success, allowing for its
endogeneity.
Our main conclusion in all model specifications is that school quality has a positive
effect on the decision to continue full time education. This has important implications
for overall educational outcomes. Our results add micro – based evidence to the findings
of Card and Krueger (1992) that school quality has a positive effect on the length of
education.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the data used
for the estimation. In section 3, we present the econometric model. Section 4 discusses
the results, and section 5 concludes.
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2 Data and Variables
Our data source is the National Child and Development Survey (NCDS). The same data
source is used for several other studies on the UK on similar topics, such as Harmon
and Walker (1997), Feinstein and Symons (1997), Robertson and Symons (1996), and
Dearden, Ferri and Meghir (1998). The NCDS followed a cohort of individuals born
between 3rd and 9th March 1958 (see Micklewright (1986) for a detailed description of
these data). Of particular interest is the data recorded in the third and fourth sweeps of
the survey (ncds3 and ncds4) and information collected in the Public Examinations
Survey (pes), a follow-up survey to ncds3. ncds3 was conducted in the spring of
1974, and records extensive information about the respondents, such as educational
and physical development, aspirations for the future, spare time activities etc., as well
as much of the information usually gathered in household surveys. Similar information
was also gathered for ncds4 in 1981 when cohort members were aged 23. ncds4 also
contains further details on education and employment experience. We thus have an
accurate picture of teenagers and their family prior to and after the choices made at
the age of 16.
We take as our measure of academic success the number of Ordinary level (O’ level)
passes achieved by 1974.1 Since ncds3 dates from Spring 1974, we observe the cohort
members when they are still in compulsory full time secondary education and a few
1In 1974, two sets of public examinations existed in Britain - Ordinary level examinations and
Certificates of Secondary Education (cses). O’ level candidates were graded on a scale of A - E,
where C and above was considered a pass. For cses, results were graded from 1 to 5 and a Grade One
was considered to be an O level equivalent. Therefore our number of O’ levels includes cse Grade
One passes.
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months before they sit their first set of public examinations, O’ levels and Certificates
of Secondary Education (cse’s), in June 1974. The pes conducted in 1978 has detailed
information on the examination results of about 95% of respondents to ncds3, obtained
from the schools.
For information on school leaving decisions, we draw on ncds4. This contains
a month-by-month diary recording the economic activity from May 1974 to January
1982. We use the information recorded in February 1975 to see whether the cohort
members were at the end of their sixteenth year, full-time at school, had a regular job,
or were following a training programme.2
The data set used for estimation is based on a sub-sample of almost 4,000 cases
out of the possible 11,602 who were traced at ncds3, pes and ncds4. Differences in
the educational system in Scotland restricted our analysis to those teenagers living in
England and Wales. A more significant factor was the problem of missing or incorrectly
recorded information which contributed to the exclusion of some 7,000 observations
from our data set. Information collected at the third sweep was retrieved from four
separate sources (from the cohort member, from his or her parents, from the school that
the 16 year olds attended and from the teenager’s doctor) and many respondents failed
to complete one or more of the questionnaires. The studies referred to above which
use the NCDS data, faced the same problems and are based upon similar numbers of
2We classify all those who have any element of training associated with their job as being in the
”training” category, in addition to those enrolled on full time training schemes. Thus, for example,
an individual in part time employment and on an apprentice scheme would be classified as being in
training, as would someone who was simultaneously on a government training scheme and in part
time education.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std Dev
Dep. Var.:
C16 Choice of activity at end of 16th year:
Stay at school 31.20
Enroll on training scheme 30.47
Regular Job 38.33
EXAM Number of O’ levels/CSE Grade 1s passed 2.34 2.91
Explanat. Var.:
oldsib Number of older siblings 0.428 0.642
yngsib Number of younger siblings 1.202 1.243
paageft∗ Age father left full-time education 4.012 1.733
maageft∗ Age mother left full-time education 4.020 1.413
ptratio Pupil-teacher ratio 17.133 2.298
loginc Logarithm of household income 3.860 0.403
pawork Father working 0.903 0.294
mawork Mother working 0.691 0.462
paprof Father’s occupational class professional 0.057 0.231
modern Teenager attends a secondary modern school 0.246 0.431
tech Teenager attends a technical school 0.008 0.090
comp Teenager attends a comprehensive school 0.530 0.499
(non-selective state run)
grammar Teenager attends a grammar school 0.149 0.356
(higher ability state run)
indep Teenager attends a private school 0.044 0.206
special Teenager attends a special school 0.020 0.140
(handicapped and special needs children)
singsex Teenager attends a single sex school 0.266 0.442
intpar Teacher considers parents to be 0.745 0.435
interested in teenager’s school work
paralev Parents want teenager to sit A levels 0.252 0.434
paruniv Parents want teenager to go to university 0.356 0.478
female Teenager is female 0.500 0.500
room With private room for studying 0.893 0.310
able7 Percent score on sum of age 7 maths and reading test 73.85 20.55
able11 Percent score on sum of age 11 maths and reading test 57.61 19.51
able16 Percent score on sum of age 16 maths and reading test 60.60 18.95
abs1 Absent from school for health reasons 1 week - 1 month 0.351 0.477
(during year before examination)
abs2 Absent from school for health reasons 1 - 3 months 0.066 0.248
(during year before examination)
abs3 Absent from school for health reasons > 3 months 0.009 0.099
(during year before examination)
unemp(la) Unemployment rate (Local Authority) 4.925 2.057
uman(la) Percentage unskilled manual workers (Local Authority) 7.328 2.755
∗: These variables are measured on a scale from 1 to 10; 1 denotes that
the parent left school aged 13 or less, 2 aged 13-14 etc.
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observations. Table 1 explains the variables used in our analysis and provides means
and standard deviations.
3 School Quality and Educational Achievements
Our dependent variables are exam results and the choice at age 16 between continuing
full time schooling, training, or a regular job. In this section we discuss the factors
that drive these outcomes and the corresponding variables constructed from our data.
Educational outcomes of school children depend on a number of factors. The family
background plays almost certainly a most important role, which affects pupil’s achieve-
ments in various ways. In the tradition of Becker (1981), one may want to distinguish
between financial and time resources allocated to the child. Financial resources may
be used to choose better schools for the child, and to provide a more suitable envi-
ronment for studying. Time inputs may consist of the time parents spend with the
child for explaining homework exercises, for instance. However, not only is the amount
of resources allocated to the child important for enhancing her performance, but also
the efficiency of its use. For instance, better educated parents are likely to be more
efficient when supporting the child with homework, and may provide more support for
her academic development.
In the empirical analysis, we measure financial resources of the family by family
income.3 As a measure of time inputs, we use the labour market status of the parents,
particularly of the mother. As measures for the quality of time, we include parental
3The income information in ncds3 is recorded in a banded form. We constructed a continuous
measure of income, taking into account all sources of household income, following Micklewright (1986).
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education. Not only parental input affects the child’s performance, but also the study-
ing conditions. We include a variable which measures whether the child has a separate
room in which to study. In families with more than one child, children are likely to
compete for resources. Becker’s (1981) work suggests that parental attention is reduced
as family size increases. Hanushek (1992) finds that the birth order plays an important
role for children’s academic performance. We therefore include the number of older
and younger siblings among our regressors.
When isolating the effects of school quality variables on academic achievement, not
only do contemporary factors play a role, but also differences in previous academic
preparations. Pupils with different previous achievements may, for instance, go to
schools of different quality, and previous achievements should be included to isolate
the effects of present school characteristics. We follow Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor
(1996) and use standardized test scores to control for these differences. Test scores
also reflect differences in ability between children. We use combined test scores from
attainment tests in mathematics and reading comprehension that respondents sat at
the age of 7 and 11.
A further possible determinant for scholastic achievements is environmental factors,
such as economic characteristics of the environment where the child grows up. For
instance, attending a school in a working class environment could have some effect on
the child’s behaviour, keeping family background constant. The attitude of the peer
group of all class mates towards the importance of education, may well have some
influence on the pupil’s behavior. Furthermore, it is possible that pupils’ incentive to
work hard for their exams is affected by future labour market prospects. We therefore
include variables which measure the rate of unemployment, as well as the percentage
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of unskilled manual workers, on a local authority level.4
Parental interest in the child’s academic performance may not be entirely cap-
tured by the above set of family background variables. Keeping wealth and education
constant, parents may still differ substantially in their preferences regarding the edu-
cation of their child. As has been emphasised by Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996),
correlation between these preferences and school quality – which may depend upon
the parents’ choice, may lead to an upward bias of the effect of school quality if the
parents’ preferences are omitted. It is therefore desirable to include variables which
capture the parents’ interest in the offspring’s educational career. We use a variable
which reflects the opinion of the teacher on the parent’s interest in the teenager’s school
performance, and variables which indicate whether the parents want the teenager to
complete Advanced levels (A’ levels) or to follow a University education.
Our quality measure is the pupil teacher ratio on school level. It is derived as the
ratio of the total school roll and the number of full time equivalent teachers. Aggre-
gation to school level avoids the endogeneity problem of class level ratios, which arises
if weak pupils are assigned to small classes (see Card and Krueger (1996)). The pupil
teacher ratio is likely to be related to the type of school the child attends. In the em-
pirical analysis, we estimate specifications which use this ratio as the only measure of
quality, and specifications which also include dummy variables which specify the type
of school that the 16 year old attended in 1974.5
4This information is drawn from the 1971 census. The local authority data covers around 500
separate areas, and therefore relates to quite narrowly defined labour market areas.
5During the early 1970s, the tripartite selection-based system of grammar schools, secondary mod-
ern schools and technical schools was still being used in many local authorities, while in other areas,
mixed ability comprehensive schools were already introduced (see Harmon and Walker (1997) for
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The continuation decision after completion of the minimum required school educa-
tion is a choice between full time education, activities with some elements of training
attached, and joining the labour market full time. This decision should depend on sim-
ilar factors as examination performance. Since it is taken after public examinations, a
structural specification also conditions on the exam outcome. School quality may affect
career choice directly, and in an indirect way via exam results. The direct effect could
be caused by better decision making support in schools which allocate more resources
to their pupils, or by peer pressure. Furthermore, pupils may use the efficiency of past
education as a benchmark when planning their future career. If pupil teacher ratios
increase this efficiency, then pupils who attended schools with lower ratios may react
to the increased payoff by choosing further full time education. Finally, as pointed out
by Card and Krueger (1996), increased school quality may make schools more pleasant,
and induce children to stay on beyond the minimum required age.
The set of factors which affect examination performance and career choices alike
may be summarised in the following equation:
Oi = f(Fi, Ei, Ti, Si, εi) (1)
where i is the individual, Oi is the outcome variable, Fi are family background
variables, Ei are environmental factors, Ti are variables which capture the attainment
history of the individual, and Si are variables which measure school quality.
The function f and the assumptions on the distribution of the error term εi reflect
the choice of the model. The number of O’ level passes obtained at age 16 ranges from
details).
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0 to 9 and is zero for about 50 percent of all individuals. This suggests the use of a
Tobit model. Since the outcome is always one of the integer numbers 0,1,...,9, other
options are ordered probit (or logit), grouped probit, or some count data model like
the Poisson or the negative binomial model.
The career choice after the exams will depend on the same types of factors as the
exam results, and on the exam results themselves. The three alternatives, i.e. con-
tinuing full-time education (C16 = 2), going into a training programme (C16 = 1),
or entering the labour force (C16 = 0), can be viewed as ordered and modeled by an
ordered probit model. Alternatively, a multinomial logit can be used, not exploiting
the ordering. The multinomial logit model is more flexible since it includes two linear
combinations of the explanatory variables instead of one, but it imposes an indepen-
dence assumption among choices. We use here a generalized ordered probit model,
where one of the category boundaries depends upon the regressors. See appendix for
the complete model. This model has the same degree of flexibility and the same number
of parameters as the multinomial logit model. It avoids the independence of irrelevant
alternatives assumption and instead uses the ordering of the alternatives. This seems
to be more appropriate than unordered multinomial logit (or probit) in the current
context. 6





Table 2 presents tobit estimates, where the dependent variable is the number of O
levels achieved.7 The first column is a basic specification, which includes various family
background variables, and the pupil teacher ratio. Most variables are significant (at the
two-sided 5% level) with the expected sign. Both older and younger siblings affect exam
success negatively, with older siblings being more important. This is in line with other
studies which find birth order important for school success (Behrman and Taubman
(1986), Hanushek (1992)). The effect of the mother working is negative, reflecting that
a working mother spends less time to help the child. Children with their own room to
study perform significantly better than others. The education levels of both parents
are strongly positively related to exam success. In this specification, the pupil teacher
ratio has a significant and sizable negative effect on the exam results: An increase in
the pupil teacher ratio by one standard deviation decreases the number of O’ levels
achieved by about 0.7.
In column 2, we have included standardised test score variables which measure past
performance. Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996) emphasise the need to control for
past performance to isolate the effect of contemporaneous school quality variables. In
the absence of these variables, if individuals with poor past performance select into
lower quality schools, school quality indicators tend to be downward biased. Further-
more, past achievements may be determined by family characteristics which also effect
7Ordered probit or count data models led to qualitatively similar results. OLS results are also
similar, but with higher significance levels in general.
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current performance. The results in column 2 show that including past performance
indicators changes the coefficient on the ptratio variable quite dramatically. The effect
on exam performance drops by one half, but remains statistically significant. Further-
more, the effects of the other family background variables change as well. For instance,
the effect of father’s and mother’s education drops by about one half. The effect of
family income decreases, and becomes insignificant. This indicates that both school
quality and past performance are positively related to family resources and parental
background.
In column 3, we have conditioned on unemployment rates and the percentage of
unskilled manual workers on local authority level, as well as on parental preferences re-
garding the offspring’s future academic career. The local labour market indicators turn
out to be insignificant, while parental interest variables have a strong and significant
effect on examination performance. For example, conditional on parental and family
background and the child’s past performance, the parents’ wish that the child attends
university increases the number of O’ levels achieved by 2.7.8 Including these variables
reduces the size of the variable ptratio only slightly, and it remains significant.
In column 4 we add school type dummies. The base category refers to secondary
modern schools (lower ability public schools). The dummies for grammar school-
s, state run schools, and private schools are significant with the expected positive
sign. Teenagers attending comprehensive (non-selective state run), technical, gram-
8Parental preferences are potentially endogenous: variables which are not observed in the data,
but known to the parents, and affect parents’ preferences about the child’s career as well as the child’s
exam performance, may lead to an upward bias of the coefficients of the preference variables. Some
of these factors should be captured by the past performance indicator variables able7 and able11.
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Table 2: Exam Equation, Tobit Models
Specification 1 2 3 4
Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio
constant -1.762 -1.68 -10.512 -10.31 -9.265 -9.25 -10.62 -9.29
oldsib -0.872 -7.04 -0.548 -4.98 -0.462 -4.41 -0.464 -4.53
yngsib -0.534 -8.45 -0.254 -4.40 -0.173 -3.17 -0.160 -3.00
pawork 1.721 5.45 0.292 1.11 0.236 0.95 0.297 1.22
paprof 0.948 3.20 0.877 3.22 0.618 2.42 0.579 2.34
mawork -0.339 -1.99 -0.325 -2.14 -0.213 -1.48 -0.185 -1.31
female 0.521 3.53 -0.063 -0.48 -0.006 -0.05 -0.025 -0.21
paageft/10 5.602 9.61 2.563 5.89 1.608 3.86 1.441 3.53
maageft/10 4.334 8.98 2.783 5.36 1.625 3.28 1.595 3.27
loginc 0.763 3.35 0.319 1.61 0.022 0.11 -0.013 -0.07
room 0.945 3.69 0.607 2.64 0.455 2.07 0.400 1.86
ptratio -0.307 -8.17 -0.150 -4.23 -0.116 -3.43 -0.090 -0.22
able7/10 0.469 9.62 0.358 7.72 0.304 6.62
able11/10 1.195 24.00 1.017 21.28 0.920 19.14
intpar 0.935 5.87 0.896 5.76
paruniv 2.710 16.50 2.443 15.01
parAlev 1.088 6.49 0.994 6.07
unemp(la) 0.009 0.23 0.004 0.08







σuE 4.102 58.60 3.025 60.54 2.929 58.44 2.78 55.62
Log-Lik. -6956.16 -5020.47 -4849.52 -4740.31
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Table 2a: PTRATIO, various school types
School type N. Obs. PTRATIO STD
modern 947 18.25 1.69
comp 2021 17.13 1.58
tech 29 16.67 1.76
grammar 558 16.11 1.41
indep 178 14.69 2.80
special 78 13.21 4.17
singsex 1018 16.47 2.22
mar schools (higher ability state run schools) (variables grammar, or independent
(selective non-state run schools indep) perform significantly better, relative to pupils
in secondary modern schools.
The order of the effects of school types is reversely related to the pupil teacher ratio,
as shown in table 2a. The coefficient of the ptratio variable decreases only slightly,
but the standard error increases substantially, which is due to the collinearity between
this variable and the school type variables. However, the effect of school type dummies
is considerably larger than what we could expect as a result of mere differences in the
pupil teacher ratio. For example, the average difference in ptratio between grammar
schools and modern schools of -2.1, combined with the parameter estimate of -0.116
in column 2 would lead to an effect of 0.23, much less than the coefficient of 1.91
for grammar schools in column 3. Other factors, such as peer group effects (more
intelligent class mates in better schools) or quality of teachers are apparently more
important for exam results than the pupil teacher ratio.
To conclude, our results indicate that school quality, as measured by the number of
pupils per full time teacher on school level, has an effect on exam performance, even
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after controlling for parental background, parental preferences, community variables,
and the child’s past performance. Omitting parental background variables and, in
particular, past performance indicators, leads to a substantial inflation of the effect of
the school quality variable. The effect of the pupil teacher ratio becomes insignificant
if we add school type variables as an additional set of school quality indicators.
Career Choice
We first discuss probit estimates of the probability that a student decides to continue
in full time education. We thus collapse training and school leaving into one alternative
category. In table 3, we present the results.
The specifications we have estimated are the same as in table 2. They are reduced
form estimations in the sense that we do not condition on exam success. We report
the marginal effects of changing the regressors on the probability of staying in full
time education, evaluated at the mean values of the regressors (reported in table 1).
The results in column 1 show that family background variables are important for the
staying on decision of the teenager. Pupils in larger families are less likely to stay
in school, where, again, older siblings seem to matter more than younger siblings.
The father’s and mother’s years of education have the expected positive impact on
the child’s probability to continue full time education. Family income is positive and
significant. The effect of the variable ptratio is quite strong and significant. An
increase of the variable ptratio by one standard deviation reduces the probability
that the child stays on in full time education by 9 percentage points.
In column 2, we condition on the test score variables at age 7 and age 11. As for
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Table 3: Full Time Education, Probit Models; Marginal Effects
Specification 1 2 3 4
Effect t-ratio Effect t-ratio Effect t-ratio Effect t-ratio
cons -0.229 -2.01 -0.789 -5.74 -0.589 -3.67 -0.675 -4.44
oldsib -0.080 -5.85 -0.053 -3.57 -0.039 -2.62 -0.040 -2.65
yngsib -0.030 -4.44 -0.023 -2.95 -0.011 -1.38 -0.009 -1.18
pawork 0.077 2.40 0.041 1.16 0.036 1.00 0.045 1.21
paprof 0.219 5.86 0.161 4.03 0.119 3.05 0.121 3.03
mawork -0.012 -0.66 -0.014 -0.71 -0.003 -0.18 -0.002 -0.12
female 0.004 0.28 -0.027 -1.55 -0.018 -1.03 -0.021 -1.17
paageft/10 0.625 9.72 0.332 5.62 0.183 3.08 0.165 2.74
maageft/10 0.430 8.36 0.442 6.15 0.239 3.35 0.233 3.19
loginc 0.060 2.44 0.029 1.08 -0.022 -0.82 -0.030 -1.09
room 0.096 3.42 0.095 2.99 0.067 2.12 0.061 1.91
ptratio -0.041 -10.03 -0.032 -6.68 -0.030 -6.23 -0.019 -3.54
able7/10 0.045 6.68 0.031 4.66 0.026 3.87
able11/10 0.073 11.01 0.049 7.31 0.041 5.91
intpar 0.064 2.81 0.059 2.57
paruniv 0.453 18.46 0.439 17.56
parAlev 0.232 9.15 0.224 8.72
unemp(la) 0.001 0.36 0.000 0.17







Log-Lik. -1982.18 -1419.99 -1193.69 -1174.53
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exam success, this reduces the effects of family background variables, indicating that
past performance is related to background variables in the same way as the staying on
decision. Including these variables mildly reduces the effect of the pupil teacher ratio,
and it remains strongly significant. In column 3, we add parental preference variables as
well as local labour market indicators. This hardly affects the coefficient of the variable
ptratio. As expected, parental interest and parental preferences have a strong effect
on the staying on decision. The local labour market indicators are insignificant.
Finally, in column 4 we add the school type variables. This reduces the size of the
coefficient of ptratio, but, other than in the examination equation, this coefficient
remains significant. Conditional on the type of school attended, an increase in the
pupil teacher ratio by one standard deviation decreases the staying on probability by
about 4.3 percent. Accordingly, the pupil teacher ratio appears to have a considerable
influence on future career choices, even conditional on school type variables.
Again, the effects of the school type variables are quite strong, and reflect more than
the mere difference in the pupil teacher ratios (reported in table 2a). The ordering of
the parameter estimates is similar to that in the examination equation; pupils who
attend grammar or independent schools have a 16 and 19 percentage points higher
probability to stay on in full time education than pupils in the base category (modern
schools). Here, the school type dummies may be capturing a number of effects. For
example, peer pressure in grammar or independent schools may discourage teenagers
from leaving school at the first possible opportunity. Furthermore, specialist staff
employed to give informed advice about education and career choices may have an
effect on school–leaving decisions.
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School, Training or Work
We now turn to models which distinguish between the two alternatives to full time
education, i.e. training and labour market participation. We have estimated multino-
mial logit models and generalised ordered probit models in which one of the cut off
points is allowed to vary with the exogenous variables (see appendix). The latter model
has the same flexibility as the multinomial logit model and avoids the assumption of
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and we therefore report results for this model
only. However, multinomial models basically led to the same conclusions.
We report results of the specification which corresponds to specification 4 in table 3,
which includes school type variables. Table 4 displays the estimated marginal effects.
The effect of the pupil teacher ratio on the staying on decision is similar to that
for the simple probit model. It increases the probability to enroll in training schemes,
or to join the labour market, to equal parts, where the latter effect is significant only
at the 10 percent level. To split up the non–education category reveals some further
interesting details. For instance, while females do not differ significantly from males as
regards their staying on decision, they tend to be much more likely to join the labour
market than to enroll in some training schemes. In many other cases, the effects respect
the expected ordering. For example, the test scores at age 11 have a positive impact
on the probabilities of both states versus regular employment, with the effect on full
time education much larger than that on training. Similar results hold for the family
background variables and for parental preferences.
The models presented in tables 3 and 4 are reduced form specifications in the sense
that they do not include examination performance as a regressor. We have estimated
20
Table 4: Career Decisions, Marginal Effects.
Decision: Stay in School Training Labour Market
Variable Effect t-ratio Effect t-ratio Effect t-ratio
oldsib -0.040 2.80 0.001 0.07 0.039 2.77
yngsib -0.010 1.18 -0.007 1.04 0.018 2.33
pawork 0.044 1.16 0.005 0.15 -0.050 1.37
paprof 0.121 2.80 -0.027 0.44 -0.093 1.47
mawork -0.003 0.18 0.033 1.57 -0.029 1.36
female -0.027 1.44 -0.187 9.87 0.215 10.86
paageft/10 0.145 2.40 0.077 1.02 -0.223 2.76
maageft/10 0.229 3.08 -0.086 0.94 -0.143 1.55
loginc -0.020 0.69 0.003 0.12 0.016 0.52
room 0.054 1.68 0.009 0.34 -0.063 2.17
ptratio -0.019 3.69 0.010 2.34 0.009 1.77
able7/10 0.021 3.10 -0.002 0.47 -0.019 3.05
able11/10 0.042 5.58 0.008 1.29 -0.051 7.17
intpar 0.065 2.86 0.019 0.98 -0.084 3.89
paruniv 0.443 18.18 -0.084 3.34 -0.359 13.97
paralev 0.231 9.50 -0.016 0.82 -0.215 9.14
unemp(la) 0.001 0.16 -0.013 2.56 0.012 2.44
uman(la) -0.005 1.37 0.003 0.86 0.002 0.66
comp 0.066 2.60 -0.015 0.77 -0.051 2.28
tech 0.137 1.77 -0.022 0.22 -0.115 1.04
grammar 0.160 4.74 -0.212 4.42 0.051 1.08
indep 0.185 3.10 -0.021 0.28 -0.164 1.83
singsex 0.025 1.18 0.011 0.49 -0.036 1.54
Log-Likelihood: -7132.44
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a number of structural models where we condition additionally on exam performance.
The structural estimation results are insightful to access the robustness of our findings,
and to investigate whether structural estimation changes the effect of the other param-
eter estimates. We estimate examination and continuation equations simultaneously
by maximum likelihood (see appendix for details). Although we condition explicitly on
previous ability test scores, therefore controlling for usually unobservable ability com-
ponents, some unobserved heterogeneity may be left which affects both examination
performance and career decisions. To account for potential endogeneity bias of exami-
nation performance in the career choice equation, we allow for correlation between the
errors in exam success and career choice equations.
To identify this model without relying on the normality assumption of the error
terms requires exogenous instruments that do not affect the career choice directly. We
have experimented with two different identification strategies. First, we have included
a set of 118 county dummies in the examination equation, but we have excluded these
variables from the career choice equation. School expenditures in the UK are decided
on county level, and county dummies should capture level effects of school quality.
This is valid if variations in school expenditures, as reflected by the county dummies,
affect career choices only indirectly via examination success, conditional on background
variables and previous achievements.
Second, we use indicators of school absenteeism for reasons of illness in the year
before the final examinations. Here our assumption for the validity of our instruments
is that absenteeism affects career choices only indirectly via examination success. This
seems reasonable as long as past health hazards are of an unforeseen and temporary
nature – for instance, absenteeism because of flu, or a minor accident, may affect exam-
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Table 5: Career Decisions, Marginal Effects of PTRATIO.
Decision: Stay in School Training Labour Market
Variable Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio
Identification: Normality; No School Types
Total Effect -0.0273 5.20 0.0149 3.442 0.0124 2.61
Direct Effect -0.0235 4.72 0.0132 3.066 0.0102 2.16
Indirect Effect -0.0038 2.33 0.0016 1.935 0.0022 1.52
Log-Likelihood: -7175.88; ρ = -0.138; t-value = 1.95
Identification: Absenteeism; No School Types
Total Effect -0.0276 5.12 0.0147 3.23 0.0129 2.56
Direct Effect -0.0225 4.50 0.0133 2.91 0.0092 1.84
Indirect Effect -0.0051 2.60 0.0014 1.80 0.0037 2.04
Log-Likelihood: -7159.98; ρ = -0.056; t-value: 0.85
Identification: County Dummies; No School Types
Total Effect -0.0327 5.82 0.0173 4.06 0.0154 3.05
Direct Effect -0.0266 4.97 0.0151 3.57 0.0115 2.30
Indirect Effect -0.0061 2.72 0.0022 2.08 0.0038 1.89
Log-Likelihood: -7121.84; ρ = -0.107; t-value: 1.73
Identification: Absenteeism; School Types included
Total Effect -0.0175 2.85 0.0103 2.12 0.0072 1.38
Direct Effect -0.0173 3.00 0.0102 2.13 0.0070 1.40
Indirect Effect -0.0002 0.12 0.0001 0.11 0.0002 0.12
Log-Likelihood: -7100.34ρ = −0.028 ; t-value: 0.43
ination performance, but, conditional on exam scores, should not have a direct effect
on career choice. However, if health problems which have affected school attendance,
are more permanent, they may also affect career choices in a direct manner, even after
conditioning on past examination performance. In this case, our instruments would be
invalid.
Finally, we also estimate models which rely on normality for identification only.
Our results under the various identification assumptions are quite similar and simi-
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lar to those in table 4. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the model in table 4 including
exam performance, where absenteeism variables are used as instruments. Comparing
the reduced form and the structural specifications shows that conditioning on exam
success reduces most other coefficients in magnitude, but does not change any of the
qualitative conclusions. The effect of examination performance on the staying on deci-
sion is, as expected, positive, but quite moderate in size. The effect of the pupil teacher
ratio on the probability to stay on at school is significantly negative.
Table 5 summarises the main results for the various specifications. The first model
is nested in the other three. Likelihood ratio tests show that the absenteeism variables
are jointly significant in the exam success equation, while the county dummies are not.
The correlation between the unobservables is negative, but exogeneity of examination
performance is not rejected in all cases. We have decomposed the total effect of the
pupil teacher ratio on the three decisions (corresponding to the effect in the reduced
form equation) into a direct effect and an indirect effect via examination performance.
Point estimates of the marginal effects and t-statistics are also presented in table 5 (see
appendix for calculation), for the various specifications.
The first three panels display results when school type variables are excluded, for
the three specifications. The first row reports the total effect; in the next two rows,
the total effect is broken down into its direct and indirect components. The effect of
the pupil teacher ratio is quite similar in the three cases. The total effect is strongly
significant. An increase in the pupil teacher ratio by one standard error decreases the
probability that the child stays on at school by 6 to 7 percentage points. The indirect
effect is significantly different from zero, but it contributes only to one fourth of the
total effect.
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The last panel reports results when school type variables are included, where ab-
senteeism is used for identification. The indirect effect of ptratio now drops to zero,
as expected from the results in table 2, and the direct effect is reduced in size. Both the
direct and the total effect of the child teacher ratio on the choice for full time education
remain significantly negative.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the effect of school quality measures on exam success and career choices
of 16 year old school children. Accordingly, we examine the effects of school input on
performance and career decisions at a particularly early stage of the students’ career.
We find that, conditional on parental background information and the teenager’s past
performance, the pupil teacher ratio has a significant and negative effect on exami-
nation performance. The British school system distinguishes between various school
types, among them selective and non-selective schools. If we condition on school type
variables, this effect of the pupil teacher ratio becomes insignificant.
As for career choices, we focus on the decision at age 16. For an analysis of the
impact of the quality of secondary schools, this seems a more direct approach than
looking at the ultimate level of education attained. We conclude that the impact of
rising pupil teacher ratios is perhaps much more important than previously thought.
We find that teenagers in schools with high pupil teacher ratios have a larger probability
to drop out of school at age 16. This effect prevails even when controlling for school
types and when conditioning on previous exam performance. It is also robust for the
type of model that is used. Thus, an increase in pupil teacher ratios is likely to affect far
25
more than just educational performance, if the more long term issues are considered.
These results are in line with earlier findings by Card and Krueger (1992), who use
state level data for the U.S. and find that a decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio increases
the average length of education.
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Appendix: Structural Model, Likelihood Contributions, and
Marginal Effects
We model the number of O’ level passes obtained at age 16 as a censored regression equation:
E∗i = AEi βE + uEi ; Ei = max(E
∗
i , 0) . (2)
Here E denotes the number of O’ levels achieved, E∗ is a latent variable, AE is a vector of
explanatory variables, and uE is an error term.
The choice between continuing full-time education (C16 = 2), going into a training programme
(C16 = 1), and entering the labour force (C16 = 0) is modeled as an ordered response:
C∗i = ACi βC + γC Ei + uCi, (3)
Ci = 0 if C
∗
i < 0, Ci = 1 if 0 < C
∗
i < mCi , Ci = 2 if C
∗
i > mC .
Here C∗i is a latent variable, ACi is a vector of explanatory variables, and uC is an error term. In
a structural specification, the index C∗ depends on exam success, with coefficient γC . In the standard
ordered probit model, the category bound mC > 0 is estimated as an additional parameter. We allow
mC to depend on all explanatory variables in the equation:
mCi = exp(ACi βm + γm Ei ) . (4)
This leads to a model with the same degree of flexibility as the multinomial logit model, in which
the alternatives are not ordered (cf. Pradhan and Van Soest (1995) for a comparison of the two in a
similar framework).
The error terms uE and uC are assumed to be independent from all explanatory variables and
bivariate normally distributed. By means of normalisation, we set Var(uC) = σ
2
uC = 1. The
correlation between the two errors, Corr(uC , uE), is given by ρ. For the structural model, we include
exam outcomes as additional regressors in (3) and (4).
Likelihood Contribution
We only present the likelihood contributions of individuals with C16 = 1 (training scheme). Likelihood
contributions of those with C16 = 0 or C16 = 2 are derived in a similar manner. We distinguish two
cases:
1): E = 0; C = 1.
28
The likelihood contribution is given by
L = P{E∗ < 0, 0 < C∗ < mC}
= P{uE < −XE βE ,−XC βC < uC < mC −XC βC } .
(5)
For mC , the expression in (4) can be substituted.
2): E = E∗ > 0; C = 1.
Denote the residual in the exam equation by eE = E −XE βE . Then the likelihood contribution
is given by
L = fE∗(E) P{0 < C∗ < mC |E} =
= fuE (eE) P{−XC βC − δC E < uC < mC −XC βC − δC E| uE = eE}
(6)
Here fE∗ and fuE are the univariate normal densities of E
∗ (conditional on exogenous variables) and
uE .
We use the BFGS algorithm in gauss to maximize the likelihood, and computed the standard
errors from the outer products of the scores.
Marginal Effects in School Leaving Equation
The computation of the marginal effects presented in Tables 4 is based on (3) and (4). For notational
convenience, we write ZC = (XC , E), θC = (β
′
C , δC)
′, and θm = (β
′
m, δm)
′. We then have
∂P [C = 0|ZC ]
∂ZC
= −fuC (−ZCθC)θC , (7)
∂P [C = 1|ZC ]
∂ZC
= fuC (−ZCθC)θC + fuC (mC − ZCθC ) [mC θm − θC ], (8)
∂P [C = 2|ZC ]
∂ZC
= fuC (mC − ZCθC) [θC −mC θm]. (9)
Since the marginal effects are functions of the parameters, the standard errors of their estimates
can be computed from the standard errors of the parameter estimates (taking the distribution of ZC
as given). This can in principle be done by the delta method. A computationally easier alternative
is to use simulations. The standard errors in the tables are computed as the standard deviations
in samples of 500 marginal effects, computed from 500 draws of the vector of parameters from the
estimated asymptotic distribution of the vector of parameter estimates.
The total and indirect effects in the structural form equations and their standard errors (Table 6)
are computed in a similar manner. We simply substitute the terms with the inner derivatives in (7)
– (9) by the appropriate expressions, corresponding to the total and indirect effects.
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Table A1: Career Decisions, Marginal Effects.
Decision: Stay in School Training Labour Market
Variable Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio
oldsib -0.030 1.89 -0.003 0.22 0.033 2.20
yngsib -0.004 0.45 -0.010 1.25 0.014 1.83
pawork 0.029 0.70 0.010 0.29 -0.039 1.06
paprof 0.094 2.18 -0.026 0.44 -0.067 1.08
mawork 0.004 0.18 0.031 1.56 -0.036 1.63
female -0.027 1.43 -0.187 9.76 0.214 10.85
paageft/10 0.102 1.71 0.071 0.97 -0.173 2.15
maageft/10 0.199 2.59 -0.101 1.14 -0.098 1.01
loginc -0.004 0.13 -0.003 0.13 0.007 0.27
room -0.044 1.36 -0.015 0.58 0.060 2.10
ptratio -0.017 3.00 0.010 2.13 0.007 1.40
able7/10 0.016 2.24 -0.003 0.64 -0.012 2.07
able11/10 0.011 1.16 0.017 2.66 -0.028 3.09
intpar 0.040 1.60 0.029 1.48 -0.069 2.99
paruniv 0.390 13.34 -0.084 3.09 -0.306 9.46
paralev 0.228 8.91 -0.020 0.88 -0.207 8.40
unemp(la 0.001 0.16 -0.014 2.42 0.013 2.33
um(la) -0.005 1.32 0.003 0.79 0.002 0.63
comp 0.052 2.05 -0.021 1.00 -0.031 1.54
tech 0.122 1.50 -0.006 0.06 -0.116 1.16
grammar 0.082 2.13 -0.205 4.35 0.123 2.34
indep 0.131 2.16 -0.003 0.04 -0.127 1.42
singsex 0.021 0.92 0.008 0.34 -0.029 1.26
exam 0.054 5.35 -0.008 1.30 -0.046 3.57
Log-Likelihood: -7100.34; ρ = -0.028; t-value = 0.43
Instruments: Absenteeism.
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